Ben Brinckerhoff

Problems in Philosophy

11-19-00

Belief in God in the Absence of An Answer

Even with more than two thousand years of philosophy under its collective belt, humanity has still not resolved the question of the existence of God. The arguments on both side are inconclusive. Our lack of evidence leaves the issue to faith, that is, believing without evidence. This leaves mankind with a question: in the absence of direct evidence and wholly convincing arguments, what should we believe about God? The answer is that since we simply do not know either way, we should believe nothing about God.

Blaise Pascal would argue that this is impossible. He asserts that we must choose to either believe or not believe that God exists. If we admit, for the sake of argument, that we must choose, Pascal argues we should believe in God. Why? It is not because of evidence, reason, or faith. In the game of existence, Pascal claims it makes sense to wager that God exists. His argument is quite simple: no one knows if God exists or not, but we must choose which we believe. There are then four possibilities and four consequences. If we believe in God and God does exist, then we gain everything (i.e. we go to heaven and experience infinite happiness for eternity). If we believe in God and God doesn=t exist, we lose nothing. If we don=t believe in God and God does not exist, we similarly lose nothing. But if we do not believe in God and God does exist, then we lose everything (i.e. go to hell and experience infinite pain for eternity) (Pascal 317).

Pascal seems to give a clear answer to the question of what to believe about God, an answer that, on the surface, may make more sense than believing nothing in God at all. It is therefore important to understand the serious problems in his argument that make his answer unacceptable. The problems begin with Pascal=s primary contradiction. Pascal states that Aif there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible@ and that Awe are incapable of knowing . . . what He is@ (315). Yet his argument is mostly based upon the traditional Christian concept of God (an all-powerful, omniscient God who rewards those who believe in him, and punishes those who don=t). If Pascal has logical reasons to make these claims about God, he does not present them in his argument. If he does have reasons for his assumptions, he clearly cannot build upon them until he justifies his assumptions with logic and reason. He may also be making these assumptions on faith. If so, his assumptions become openly disputable to anyone belonging to a different religion. Any person with a different conception of God could reasonably argue against any of Pascal=s assumptions, and therefore attack his argument at its foundation. The validity of Pascal=s answer comes into question when it is built upon such shaky ground.

Specifically, Pascal assumes that if God exists, heaven and hell must exist. This belief is not widely accepted by all people and should not be taken for granted by Pascal. Many people today believe in God and an afterlife, but do not believe in the traditional concepts of heaven and hell. Even those who cling to the image of a pit of fire and brimstone are sometimes reluctant to point fingers as to who specifically will go there. Mankind is uncomfortable with the idea of hell, and for good reason: the idea of punishing mortal sins with eternal agony conflicts with our intuitive sense of justice. Our earthly laws reflect the fact that we want the punishment to fit the crime - this is why we do not punish shoplifting with death. Furthermore, we have no evidence of heaven or hell, or convincing logical arguments for them. We only believe in heaven and hell on faith alone, and therefore Pascal is wrong to use them as a starting point for his argument.

Pascal also assumes that faith in God is enough to determine if you are going to heaven or hell. Yet if God is infinitely incomprehensible, how can we pretend to know what God wants? Perhaps God rewards and punishes those based solely upon their good works toward others. Maybe God rewards those who refuse to have faith in anything, but instead relentlessly use the faculties of reason and logic that God has given them.

Pascal makes one last important assumption, one that directly contradicts with the traditional view of God. He assumes that God doesn=t know or care why we believe. Logically, if an omnipotent and omniscient God (if God is, in fact, omnipotent and omniscient) knows if we believe in him/her/it (and send us to heaven or hell based upon whether or not we do), God would also know and value the intentions behind our faith and be able to distinguish between true faith and the Awagering@ variety. Pascal evidently bases his arguments on a narrow, and slightly absurd, concept of God: an omniscient God who we can fool into thinking that we have true faith.

All these assumptions weaken Pascal=s answer to our question, and one could further challenge the logic of his wager by arguing more thoroughly against any one of the assumptions that his argument depends upon. It is obvious that if we are trying to find out what we should believe in light of our ignorance, Pascal=s wager doesn=t help us, since it depends upon Aknowing@ a great deal about God in advance.

Beyond the fact that his argument may not provide a solid answer on logical grounds, Pascal=s answer is also simply unsettling to many, both those who do and do not believe in God. For those who simply have faith in God, it seems selfish to only believe because you want to get the best result in the long run. For those who don=t want to rely on faith, it seems demeaning to our concept of humans as rational creatures to ignore the few (although inconclusive) reasons we may have for or against God in favor of picking the Abest@ option. This discomfort intensifies as Pascal goes on to say that if we don=t truly believe in God, we should go through the motions of believing (going to church, etc.) and essentially force ourselves to believe. Forcing a Abelief@ upon ourselves seems very wrong at the least, and perhaps impossible. Pascal=s argument makes us uncomfortable because he chooses beliefs because of their value (those beliefs that have the quality of getting us somewhere good), not because of their truth.

Another problem with Pascal=s wager is that Pascal completely neglects our responsibility for our beliefs. His argument is unsettling because he takes no responsibility for choosing correctly or incorrectly; he does not care if he is wrong, so long as he picks the most advantageous option.

The issue of responsibility is examined in detail by W. K. Clifford, who asks us to consider the example of a shipowner who was about to send his ship off to sea. He knew that the ship was old, and not very well-built, and could possibly use repairs before making its voyage. Instead of investigating this, he made himself feel better by ignoring his doubts and trusting in Providence to protect his vessel and its passengers. While he stayed on land content with his faith, the ship went off to sea and sinks (318-319).

Clifford condemns the man, not because the ship went down, but because the shipowner held a belief that he had no right to believe, which in turn led to the deaths of many. It is easy to condemn this man, because obviously his beliefs about the seaworthiness of his vessel influenced his actions which in turn had a direct consequences for his passengers. Clifford draws two analogies from this example. First, since we condemn the man for holding the unjustified belief that directed his actions, and since all of our actions are directly influenced by our beliefs, we should condemn anyone who holds an unjustified beliefs. Our beliefs are so important because they prompt us to actions, or at the very least, affect how we think absorb other similar beliefs that may direct our actions (321). Secondly, we feel the man was wrong because the actions that came from his beliefs had direct (and in this case, negative) consequences for his passengers. Clifford claims that all of our beliefs similarly affect every person we know, so we are similarly responsible for them. Through discussion and tradition, we pass our beliefs to our family, friends, and anyone who ever listens to us discuss our beliefs. Although we may not completely change their beliefs, their thoughts are affected when considering our point of view (321).

This is precisely why responsibility for our beliefs is so important. Clifford states that we must be very careful what we believe in, lest we affect others with our unjustified, wrong beliefs and possibly Akeep alive the fatal superstitions which clog [our] race@ (321). In order to have a justifiably believe in something, we must face all our doubts and hold our belief up to be questioned with reason and logic. He simply states Ait is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence@ (323).

Clifford states that we should be responsible for all our beliefs, but it=s essential to understand why our beliefs about God, and therefore our responsibility to those beliefs, are so monumentally important. Our decision about the existence of God is so important because it can affect our morality, our behavior, our belief in such subjects as the afterlife, as well as our place in that afterlife (i.e. in heaven, or hell, or wherever else). We must make sure our beliefs about God make sense to us before we risk telling others what we believe, since the consequences of these particular beliefs are so tremendous. Let=s say that I tell a friend that I don=t believe in God. He goes ahead and adopts a similar view and perhaps lives a life of sin as well. Then it turns out I was wrong and God punishes him by sending him to hell. Am I not at least partly responsible for his situation, since I planted the false seed in him?

Our beliefs about God are important for another reason as well. We have agreed that there is no conclusive evidence or convincing arguments about God. From where do people base their beliefs about God, then? It is mostly from adopting the beliefs of those around them, whether that be their parents, friends, or culture in general. Since there is no direct conclusive evidence, many people must decide their beliefs based solely upon the beliefs and testimonies of others. Our beliefs may be the only source of Ainformation@ about the existence of God for others, so we must surely choose our position very carefully.

It is evident that we have a profound responsibility to make certain our beliefs about God make sense. This explains why Pascal=s denial of responsibility is such a problem. Pascal says that if we believe in God and God exists, we win all. This may or may not be true. But he also says that if we believe in God and he doesn=t exist, we Alose nothing@ (317). This is simply not true. We will pass our false beliefs and ignorance to others, and hence hurt mankind in general. If Pascal has faith in God even with the knowledge God may not exist simply because it=s the best option, he is committing a great moral transgression against himself and humanity. Pascal doesn=t just suppress his doubts, he does something even worse: he effectively says his doubts don=t matter because he would rather Awin@ than be right.

In light of the objections above, it is apparent that Pascal does not offer the answer. Clifford=s moral standpoint on beliefs appeals to our sense of responsibility, but does it provide a framework through which to develop an satisfactory answer? Although his general moral principle is sound and reasonable, in this case, it doesn=t offer an answer itself. Clifford explicitly states that Ait is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence,@ and we have admitted that we simply do not have sufficient evidence. Clifford=s is bound to say that we cannot believe that God exists and we cannot believe that God does not exist, for either would be morally wrong.

Which brings us back to a central conflict. Pascal makes the apparently reasonable claim that we must choose one way or the other; in fact, his entire argument is based upon this idea. But why must we choose? Perhaps the reason his claim seems reasonable is because it is true when our choices concern the physical. We often times must choose one way or the other. One could go back to Clifford=s example of the shipowner. Now let=s say that he honestly wants to discover if his ship is safe or not, but, since his ship is at a different port, he cannot gather any evidence about the condition of his ship. Let=s say, for the sake of argument, that he will never be able to find out anything about his ship. What should he do? He cannot believe that his ship is sound, and he cannot believe it is unsound, for he has no evidence for either. If he lives by Clifford=s code of ethics, he is paralyzed and can do nothing. Therefore Pascal would be correct in saying he must choose, and in this case he should choose the option that he considers safer for everyone involved, that is, to not send the ship to sea and endanger his passengers.

The shipowner had no knowledge about the condition of his ship, so he chose the option that he thought would yield the best results. And he was right in doing so. This seems contradictory, since this is precisely the logic used in Pascal=s wager, which we have declared unsatisfactory in answering our question about God. But there is an important difference. We must sometimes use Pascal=s logic and wager when it comes to real world beliefs, because otherwise we could not act in some situations, such as the one above. In such cases, we must choose an action. But with God, we do not need to believe one way or the other. We can simply not believe anything.

We don=t have to believe anything about God because not believing will not paralyze us like not believing would paralyze the shipowner. This is because the shipowner must act, and to act, he must have a belief about his ship guide his action that concerns his ship. We must also act in the physical world, and we also need beliefs to guide our actions, but the beliefs determining our actions do not need to involve God. To act in the physical world, we only need beliefs concerning the physical world. It is possible to live one=s life believing nothing about God, that is, living one=s life such that it doesn=t matter if God exists or not.

Living such a life is not easy. We must live our lives such that if we were to suddenly learn that God definitely did or did not exist, our way of life would not change, nor would we regret our past actions. This means finding a balance in our actions, judgements and philosophy, and also living by a system of morality that does not depend upon God or religion, but upon respect for others or some other earthly value.

It is important to realize that this system of non-belief is the only way we should think given our current lack of evidence, and may not be the best belief about God in retrospect. It may be that God does exist, and will send all who do not believe in him to hell. But we have already admitted that Pascal=s wager was wrong for simply seeking the most valuable belief. Believing in God simply because we are scared of non-believing is another version of this same faulty logic, and so we must guard carefully against it.

Not believing anything about God is the only logical response that answers our question. We do not have evidence or reasons to believe either way, and picking one side arbitrarily may lead our friends and family to a false belief, and we would thereby commit a crime against ourselves and humanity. We must admit that we simply do not know, and live our lives accordingly. If we are tempted to just choose one side without sufficient evidence, we must remember the words of Sigmund Freud: AJust as no one can be forced to believe, so no one can be forced to disbelieve . . .[but] ignorance is ignorance; no right to believe anything can be derived from it@ (Freud 319).